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RULES TO BE INTERPRETED 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
Rule 1. General provisions. 
(a) Scope of rules. These rules shall govern the procedure in the Supreme 
Court, the district courts, the circuit courts, and the justice courts of the state of 
Utah in all actions, suits, and proceedings of a civil nature, whether cognizable at 
law or in equity, and in all special statutory proceedings, except as governed by 
other rules promulgated by this court or enacted by the Legislature and except as 
stated in Rule 81. They shall be liberally construed to secure the just, speedy, and 
inexpensive determination of every action. 
Rule 60. Relief from judgment or order. 
(a) Clerical mistakes. Clerical mistakes in judgments, orders or other parts of 
the record and errors therein arising from oversight or omission may be corrected 
by the court at any time of its own initiative or on the motion of any party and 
after such notice, if any, as the court orders. During the pendency of an appeal, 
such mistakes may be so corrected before the appeal is docketed in the appellate 
court, and thereafter while the appeal is pending may be so corrected with leave 
of the appellate court. 
(b) Mistakes; inadvertence; excusable neglect; newly discovered evidence; fraud, 
etc. On motion and upon such terms as are just, the court may in the furtherance 
of justice relieve a party or his legal representative from a final judgment, order, 
or proceeding for the following reasons: (1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or 
excusable neglect; (2) newly discovered evidence which by due diligence could not 
have been discovered in time to move for a new trial under Rule 59(b); (3) fraud 
(whether heretofore denominated intrinsic or extrinsic), misrepresentation or 
other misconduct of an adverse party; (4) when, for any cause, the summons in an 
action has not been personally served upon the defendant as required by Rule 
4(e) and the defendant has failed to appear in said action; (5) the judgment is 
void; (6) the judgment has been satisfied, released, or discharged, or a prior 
judgment upon which it is based has been reversed or otherwise vacated, or it is 
no longer equitable that the judgment should have prospective application; or (7) 
any other reason justifying relief from the operation of the judgment. The motion 
shall be made within a reasonable time and for reasons (1), (2), (3), or (4), not 
more than 3 months after the judgment, order, or proceeding was entered or 
taken. A motion under this Subdivision (b) does not affect the finality of a 
judgment or suspend its operation. This rule does not limit the power of a court 
to entertain an independent action to relieve a party from a judgment, order or 
proceeding or to set aside a judgment for fraud upon the court. The procedure 
for obtaining any relief from a judgment shall be by motion as prescribed in these 
rules or by an independent action. 
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IN THE 
COURT OF APPEALS 
OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
DENNIS J. RICHINS and 
SUESANN RICHINS, 
Plaintiffs-Appellees, 
vs. 
DELBERT CHIPMAN & SONS CO., 
INC. and D. RAY CHIPMAN, 
individually, 
Defendants-Appellants. 
vs. 
RICHARD PORTER and 
KENNETH PORTER, 
Defendants-Appellees. 
Case No. 90-0134-CA 
APPELLANTS' REPLY BRIEF 
BECAUSE OF CERTAIN new matters, both factual and legal, raised 
in the Briefs of the Appellees, Appellants deem it necessary to respond to and 
clarify those matters. 
1 
Statement of Facts 
Appellants reaffirm the statement of facts in their initial brief and make 
the following clarifications or corrections to some assertions of fact made by 
Appellees: 
1. Richins claim on page 3 of their brief that Chipman sold all four 
grazing permits to them and then sold two of those same permits to Porters. 
The fact is that Chipman sold only the Mahogany Mountain permit to Richins 
(Exh. #7) and later sold the Tooth Springs and Mill Canyon permits to Porters 
(R.147). So there was no double sale of the same permits. However, since 
Chipman knew, in April, 1987, that Richins were making a claim to all four 
permits, Chipman included a provision in the Porter agreement to reverse the 
sale to Porters if the Richins' claim were successful (R.148, HI.4). 
2. Porters claim on page 5 of their brief that the parties performed 
pursuant to the stipulation and have argued that Chipman accepted the 
benefits of the stipulation and have, therefore, ratified the stipulation and 
further that other parties have changed their positions in reliance on the 
stipulation. The facts are that the only thing Chipman received as a result of 
the stipulation was $15,700.00 which had been paid into court by Richins 
before trial and was to apply on a payment due Chipman from Richins before 
the trial took place (R.204, U6b; R.134). Chipman has not received one penny 
from anyone since that time, even though five installments of at least $9,935.00 
would have been due to Chipman under Richins' version of the stipulation 
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since that time (R.269, lines 1-6; R.322). Porters have only received 
reimbursement for the two permits they purchased from Chipman, which they 
agreed to give up if Richins successfully claimed them, as well as $20,000.00 
in claimed but unproved damages (R.321-2). Neither they nor Richins have 
changed their position in reliance on the stipulation and Chipman has received 
absolutely nothing from the stipulation. 
3. The Richins, on pp.10-13 of their brief, have referred to an affidavit 
of Noall T. Wootton to dispute the facts claimed by Chipman as to the 
settlement negotiations. However, they have failed to include the 
Supplemental Affidavit of Noall T. Wootton (included in the Addendum to this 
Brief and which was to be a part of the Record-see R.674-5, lines 20-25, 1-12; 
R.449) which clearly shows that he did not agree with Richins' interpretation 
of the stipulation as to double semi-annual deductions of $2,500.00 from 
payments to Chipman which would total $45,000.00. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
I. The standard of review is for correctness of the lower court's decision. The 
lower court concluded that it did not have jurisdiction to hear Chipman's 
motions. It did not hold an evidentiary hearing to determine any facts. There 
was no completed trial from which facts could be found. There were no 
findings to which this court must defer. The question of jurisdiction is one of 
law. It involves the interpretation of the rules. The facts alleged in support 
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of the motions must be taken as true since there has been no hearing to 
determine the facts. This appeal involves a question of law only which is 
reviewable only for correctness and not for abuse of discretion. 
II. The Stipulation has not been ratified by acceptance of benefits. Chipman 
has not received one penny from Richins since the date of the stipulation. 
Chipman did receive some funds that had been paid into court before trial to 
apply to installments due before trial. But the stipulation provides for semi-
annual installments to Chipman for nine years. None of those installments has 
been paid even though the due dates for five of them have passed. There have 
been no benefits to accept. Chipman has not ratified the stipulation and has 
not waived any rights to challenge it. 
III. The two Wootton affidavits, read together, support and prove Chipman's 
claims. The first Wootton affidavit was prepared by Richins' attorney and 
recites the conclusions necessary to support Richins' position. It is self-serving 
and does not address the essential issues of ambiguity, incompleteness and 
unconscionability. Wootton's supplemental affidavit, however, points out a 
discrepancy in the first affidavit that would cost Chipman $45,000.00. That 
proves a substantial portion of Chipman's claims in this case. But it also 
proves that Mr. Wootton did not carefully review either the stipulation or his 
first affidavit. His failure to address the other losses resulting to Chipman 
from the stipulation indicates his lack of understanding or lack of concern for 
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those matters. The Wootton affidavits, both in what they do and do not say, 
support and prove Chipman's claims. 
IV. The cases which deny relief from judgments all provide for such relief in 
the exceptional circumstances of this case. The cases cited by Richins and 
Porters, while they deny relief from judgments, state that the decision would 
be otherwise in the case of unusual or aggravating circumstances or if justice 
should so require. The circumstances of this case are aggravating and justice 
does require relief from the stipulation. Chipman loses $281,000.00 by the 
stipulation while a default judgment would have cost him only $130,000.00. 
That's aggravating! That's unjust! The injustice of this matter is so obvious 
that neither Richins nor Porters have dared to address it. They hope this 
court will also ignore it by concluding it has no jurisdiction to consider 
unconscionability. Even the cases cited by Richins and Porters would provide 
relief under the circumstances of this case. 
V. Rule 60(b)(5), (6) and (7) apply to the facts of this case. The meaning of 
mistake in Rule 60(b)(1) does not include the broad use of the term "mistake" 
used in general conversation which encompasses all errors and injustices one 
might imagine. Otherwise, all of the other terms in Rule 60(b) are surplusage. 
A set of facts may fit within more than one subdivision of the rule. We should 
not contort those facts or distort the rule to force those facts in or out of any 
subdivision. In this case the facts come within Rule 60(b)(5), (6) and (7) and, 
therefore, the three-month limitation does not apply, even if those facts might 
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also constitute a mistake within the all-encompassing conversational use of that 
word. The essence of this case is an ambiguous, incomplete and 
unconscionable stipulation which is unenforceable and void. The interests of 
justice require relief from it. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE STANDARD OF REVIEW IN THIS CASE IS TO REVIEW 
THE LOWER COURT'S DECISION FOR CORRECTNESS AND 
NOT FOR ABUSE OF DISCRETION. 
Because there has been no trial and no evidentiary hearing in this 
matter from which the lower court could make a determination of facts, there 
has been no finding of facts by the lower court to which this court must defer. 
The questions on appeal relate only to an interpretation of the Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure, statutes or of documents which it is claimed constitute an 
agreement among the parties. Those are questions of law which the appellate 
court may review only for correctness. Bonham v. Morgan. 788 P.2d 497 (Utah 
1989); Neilson v. Neilson, 780 P.2d 1264 (Utah 1989); and Madsen v. Borthick. 
769 P.2d 245 (Utah, 1988). The basic issue before the court is whether or not 
the lower court had jurisdiction to consider the motions filed by Chipman. 
The lower court's order, from which this appeal was taken, was that it did not 
have jurisdiction (R.452). Jurisdiction is a question of law which is reviewable 
only for correctness. 
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The cases which have been cited by Richins and Porters for the 
proposition that the lower court's order is reviewable for abuse of discretion 
are cases in which the court states that proposition but then proceeds to 
review the lower court's decision for correctness rather than abuse of 
discretion. In Laub v. South Central Utah Telephone Assoc, Inc., 657 P.2d 
1304 (Utah 1982), the facts on which the motion to modify the judgment were 
based were undisputed. There was a double recovery by the plaintiffs. The 
lower court modified the judgment to prevent the double recovery. The 
Supreme Court held that the modification was incorrect and reversed because 
the judgment had been approved and satisfied by the moving party long before 
the motion was filed. There was no deference to the discretion of the lower 
court. In Birch v. Birch, 771 P.2d 1114 (Utah App. 1989), the lower court's 
denial of a motion for relief from a stipulation was held to be correct because 
the facts alleged in support of the motion were held, on their face, not to 
justify the relief requested. The stipulation was considered to be "fair . . . 
under all the circumstances" (at 1117). In other words, the Court of Appeals 
looked at the facts alleged to determine if they would justify the relief. There 
was no deference to any factual findings of the lower court. Furthermore, 
Birch did not involve the question of jurisdiction, a question of law, since the 
motion for relief had been filed under Rule 60(b) within three months of the 
judgment and, therefore, the court obviously had jurisdiction to consider the 
motion. In Larsen v. Collina, 684 P.2d 52 (Utah 1984), the question of 
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jurisdiction was also not seriously in dispute because inexcusable neglect was 
the reason for denying the Rule 60(b) motion. But that case was cited by 
Porters for the proposition that this court should not examine the merits of the 
underlying action. That case, however, stated only that "usually, it is not 
appropriate on Rule 60(b) motions to examine the merits of the claim decided 
by the default judgment,11 (at 55) and then proceeded to examine those merits 
and remanded the case for the taking of additional evidence. 
The question of jurisdiction to consider a Rule 60(b) motion is a 
question of law reviewable for correctness and the facts alleged in support of 
that motion must be taken as true until the court has held an evidentiary 
hearing from which it can make findings as to the facts. Richins' motion to 
strike Chipman's motions for relief is in the nature of a motion to dismiss a 
complaint for which all facts alleged in the complaint must be taken as true. 
POINT II 
THERE HAS BEEN NO PERFORMANCE OF THE 
STIPULATION OR ACCEPTANCE OF BENEFITS 
THEREUNDER THAT CONSTITUTES RATIFICATION 
THEREOF OR WAIVER OF RIGHTS TO CHALLENGE IT. 
Porters have asserted that Chipman has received substantial benefits 
under the stipulation and argue that that constitutes ratification of the 
Stipulation by Chipman. It is interesting that Richins do not argue this point 
as strongly. That is no doubt because Richins know that they have not paid 
one penny to Chipman since the date of the stipulation (a fact of which 
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Porters may not be aware). It is true that Chipman received $15,700.00 of the 
funds that had been paid into court before the trial. But those funds were 
paid into court as a tender of installments that would have been due from 
Richins to Chipman irrespective of the outcome of the trial or of the 
stipulation. Before the trial, Richins had failed to pay to Chipman the 
$21,000.00 due November 30, 1986, the $30,000.00 due November 15, 1987, 
and the $24,000.00 due December 15, 1987. The first and third of these 
installments would have been due Chipman no matter whose version of the 
facts had been accepted. The acceptance by Chipman of $15,700.00 towards 
those amounts that were already past due does not constitute ratification of a 
stipulation that bound him to lease his property and accept substantially 
reduced payments therefor for the next nine years. 
In fact, it was the failure of Richins to pay anything to Chipman which 
confirmed to Chipman that something was wrong with the stipulation. 
Although Chipman tried to find out what had happened in court, it was not 
until Richins failed to pay the installments due in April and December of 1988 
and his newly retained attorney confronted Richins and their attorney and they 
refused to acknowledge that those installments should have been paid, that the 
unconscionable nature of the supposed stipulation became obvious (R.229, 
1W2-8). Chipman then acted immediately to have the stipulation set aside. 
Since then, three more installments have come due under the stipulation and 
none of them have been paid or tendered by Richins even though they are still 
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using Chipman's property. That certainly does not constitute an acceptance 
of benefits. There have been no benefits to accept. Chipman has not, in any 
sense, consented to or ratified the stipulation and has not waived his rights to 
challenge it. 
POINT III 
THE WOOTTON AFFIDAVIT DOES NOT REFUTE THE 
CLAIMS OF CHIPMAN BUT RATHER SUPPORTS AND 
PROVES THEM. 
Both Richins and Porters have attempted to make much of the affidavit 
signed by Noall T. Wootton, Chipman's former attorney (R.381-88). It is 
important to understand all of the circumstances under which this affidavit was 
signed and filed. Although a copy of Chipman's motions, affidavits and 
memorandum were sent to Mr. Wootton, he had not reviewed them before this 
matter was heard by the lower court and was not aware of all of the claims 
being made. On May 4, 1989, one day before the hearing on Chipman's 
motions, Richins' attorney prepared an affidavit for Mr. Wootton and sent it 
to his office by facsimile machine. Mr. Wootton had the affidavit retyped with 
his heading on it and signed it. Richins' attorney then filed the affidavit with 
the court, contrary to the rules. A motion to strike the affidavit was filed but 
not considered by the court. 
Since the affidavit was prepared by Richins' attorney, it was obviously 
prepared to support Richins' position. A review of that affidavit shows that 
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Richins' attorney merely listed each item of the stipulation and of the claims 
made by Chipman and had Mr. Wootton affirm his view of those claims as if 
he were making his opening or closing argument. It certainly does not appear 
to be the spontaneous testimony of Mr. Wootton. So Richins' attorney put his 
own words into the mouth of Mr. Wootton and Chipman did not have the 
opportunity to insert an objection to leading questions. The affidavit must be 
considered suspect for that reason alone. 
In addition, one must consider the inclination of Mr. Wootton to defend 
himself against the accusations made against him by Chipman. The affidavit 
is simply a denial of those accusations and an affirmation of the facts Richins' 
attorney has put into his mouth. Oh, how one would like an opportunity to 
cross-examine! Without that opportunity, it is difficult to draw any conclusions 
from the statements made but the affidavit must be considered suspect because 
of its self-serving nature. It is significant that neither Mr. Wootton nor Richins 
or the Porters attempt to respond to Chipman's detailed outline of the 
ambiguities, incompleteness and unconscionability of the stipulation. These 
items are really the proof of Chipman's accusations. That is why Chipman has 
dwelt upon those items rather than the accusations against Mr. Wootton. 
Those items prove that Chipman was not effectively represented—no matter 
what the reason therefor. On the other hand, it is of some significance that 
Wootton, Richins and Porters have chosen to deal only with excuses, 
explanations and rationalizations for the accusations and not at all with the 
11 
results-that is, the ambiguities, incompleteness and unconscionability which 
render the stipulation void and unenforceable. 
More importantly, when Chipman's attorney pointed out to Mr. Wootton 
an obvious conflict in his affidavit, in that Richins was claiming a double 
deduction of $2,500.00 from each semi-annual installment due under the 
stipulation, he immediately prepared a supplemental affidavit and notified all 
parties of that conflict. (See Supplemental Affidavit of Noall T. Wootton and 
Wootton letter of June 7, 1989 in the Addendum to this brief and part of the 
Supplement to the Record in this case.) Mr. Wootton makes clear that he did 
not intend any more than one deduction of $2,500.00 per installment. This one 
discrepancy results in a total loss to Chipman of $45,000.00 over the nine years 
of the stipulation. So Mr. Wootton, in defending his actions, verifies the 
claims of Chipman to the extent of $45,000.00. One wonders how much more 
could be verified if given the chance to cross-examine Mr. Wootton as to all 
aspects of his affidavit. For example, how would Mr. Wootton respond when 
asked if he understood or intended that Chipman lose $281,330.00 by his 
stipulation to "compromise" and settle this lawsuit instead of only $130,000.00 
if he had just allowed Richins to take a default judgment? 
It is quite obvious that Mr. Wootton did not carefully read and analyze 
his May 4, 1989 affidavit (or rather Mr. Brown's affidavit) before he signed it. 
Does this indicate the kind of attention he was giving to Chipman's welfare 
when he allowed the stipulation in court and a week later signed the written 
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stipulation? Remember he signed that stipulation without ever seeing Exhibit 
"A" referred to therein (R.202-206) and that Exhibit was never part of the 
stipulation. It is that exhibit which Richins claims constitutes the agreement 
under which they were to operate from then on (R.313, 318-329) and which 
was intended to be signed by the parties themselves but never was (R.327-329). 
One gets the impression that Mr. Wootton was relieved not to have to put on 
his side of the case, for which he was ill-prepared, and was glad to be rid of 
the case. It certainly didn't have his attention when the matter was being 
negotiated in court, when he signed the written stipulation and when he signed 
his affidavit in May of 1989. Even his letter of June 7, 1989 refers to 
paragraph 10(c) instead of 10(g) in his prior affidavit, which may have just 
been typographical but was nevertheless not reviewed for accuracy. 
The Wootton affidavits, both in what they address and in what they fail 
to address, constitute no refutation of Chipman's claims. Rather they support 
and prove them and demonstrate that there was no meeting of the minds and 
that the stipulation was ambiguous and unconscionable. 
POINT IV 
THE CASES CITED BY RICHINS AND PORTERS MAKE 
EXCEPTIONS FOR THE KIND OF CIRCUMSTANCES 
PRESENT IN THIS CASE. 
In their briefs both Richins and Porters have cited numerous cases which 
deny relief from judgments and conclude that relief must be denied in this 
13 
case. However, almost without exception, those cases state that the decision 
would be otherwise in the event of fraud, overreaching, aggravating, unusual, 
or exceptional circumstances or if the interests of justice require. Those 
circumstances are present in this case and, therefore, the authorities relied 
upon by Richins and Porters are unavailing and, in fact, support Chipman's 
position. 
For example, Richins and Porters have cited Snyder v. Thompkins, 579 
P.2d 994 (Wash. 1978), which denied relief from a judgment based on a 
stipulation in court. The facts of that case demonstrate why. The stipulation 
was a short, one-paragraph agreement that was complete and unambiguous. 
The court scheduled an evidentiary hearing to determine if the attorney for the 
party seeking relief had authority to settle. In that hearing no claim was made 
that the attorney misrepresented the settlement terms. In fact, the 
complaining party stipulated to the attorney's integrity and professional 
competence. After the hearing the lower court found that the party "fully 
appreciated the terms of the settlement" and "was fully apprised of the 
settlement terms immediately before her attorney presented them in open 
court. Nevertheless, she voluntarily absented herself from the courtroom 
during the oral stipulation, indicating that she acquiesced in the settlement" (at 
999). The appellate court found substantial evidence to support the lower 
court's findings and, therefore, upheld the denial of relief. Those facts are far 
different from those in this case where both the competence of the attorney 
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and the enforceability of the stipulation have been challenged, where Chipman 
did not fully appreciate the terms of the settlement, and where no hearing was 
scheduled to determine whether the facts support the motion for relief. If the 
Snyder v. Thompkins court had these "countervailing facts" before it, its 
holding would have been otherwise. 
Both Richins and Porters rely heavily on Laub v. South Central Utah 
Tel. Assoc. Inc., 657 P.2d 1304 (Utah 1982). That case, in a 3-2 decision, 
reversed the lower court's granting of a motion to modify a judgment which 
had been filed more than three months after the judgment. The court held 
that Rule 60(b)(6) and (7) did not apply because the moving party had 
approved the judgment as to form and content and had fully satisfied the 
judgment long before filing its motion to modify under Rule 60(b). The court 
stated: 
"We do consider the fact of prior satisfaction an important 
consideration in determining whether the motion to modify was 
made within a reasonable time" (at 1307). 
Two justices filed strong dissenting opinions stating that the motion should 
have been granted under Rule 60(b)(6) and (7) because the reason to modify 
the judgment did not arise until after three months had expired and it was no 
longer equitable that the judgment have prospective application. It had been 
satisfied and provided double recovery to the plaintiffs. The Laub case 
provides more support to Chipman than to Richins or Porters. There has been 
no satisfaction of the judgment in this case and it did not become clear that 
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there was a need to set aside the stipulation until long after the three months 
expired. It is now obvious that the stipulation is unconscionable and ,fit is no 
longer equitable that the judgment should have prospective application." Laub 
only involved a modification of $4,347.00 while the difference here is more 
than $150,000.00. The decision in the Laub case would likely also have been 
different if it had involved these facts. It also would allow relief in "unusual 
and exceptional instances" at 1308). 
The reliance of Porters on City and County of Honolulu v. Bennett, 627 
P.2d 1136 (Haw. 1981) makes our point as well as any case could. In that case 
the arguments that the judgment should have been set aside because of newly 
discovered evidence and ineffective counsel were found to be "utterly without 
merit and frivolous" because there were no affidavits or references to the 
record to support the claims, one of which had not been raised in the lower 
court. Yet, that court bent over backwards searching the record for some 
support and even to determine what the claimed errors were. The court then 
stated: 
"It might be that a case could arise of such extreme aggravation 
with respect to the conduct of counsel that a trial court, in its 
discretion, would set aside a judgment in a civil case under Rule 
60(b)(6). There is nothing in the record to reflect that there 
were such aggravated circumstances" (at 1139). 
Even the quote from 11 Wright & Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure, 
§2864, pp. 221-3, contains this language: 
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"But if the court is persuaded that the interests of justice so 
require, it is likely to find aggravating circumstances sufficient to 
permit it to say that . . . the case is properly within clause (6)." 
[Clause (7) of the Utah Rule.] City and County of Honolulu v. 
Bennett, supra, at 1138. 
Again, this language is sufficient to indicate that the court would have ruled 
otherwise if it had the facts of this case before it. 
Porters also rely on Johnson v. People's Finance & Thrift Co., 2 U.2d 
426, 272 P.2d 171 (1954). However, the refusal to vacate a stipulation in that 
case was based substantially on a failure to provide a transcript of the evidence 
submitted at the hearing on the motion to vacate. The lower court in that case 
at least held a hearing to determine the facts but no transcript of it was 
available. The court stated: 
"In view of the state of the record, we must affirm the judgment. 
However, if in fact the tracts of property described in the 
judgment which are to be conveyed by and to the several parties 
are not properly described, we direct the trial court to correct the 
descriptions so as to comply with the stipulation of the parties" 
(at 173). 
In other words, the court, although it stated it was affirming the denial of the 
motion to vacate, directed the lower court to review the accuracy of the 
judgment. In this case, no hearing on the facts was held by the lower court 
and the full record is before the court. With those facts the Johnson court, 
too, would have decided differently. 
In Dove v. Cude, 710 P.2d 170 (Utah 1985), the Supreme Court reversed 
an order allowing the plaintiff to withdraw a stipulation because the lower 
court did not hold a hearing and did not find "as a matter of fact that plaintiff 
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did not understand or agree to the stipulation; nor did the trial court ground 
its decision to permit withdrawal of the stipulation on any legal or equitable 
basis" (at 171). That same reasoning would require a reversal in this case 
because the lower court did not hold an evidentiary hearing and did not find 
as a matter of fact that Chipman understood or agreed to the stipulation and 
did not even consider any legal or equitable bases for Chipman's motion. It 
merely determined it had no jurisdiction. Dove v. Cude clearly recognized that 
the court had jurisdiction to consider such a motion, stating that the court "has 
the power to set aside a stipulation entered into inadvertently or for justifiable 
cause." But the court must hold an evidentiary hearing, make findings of fact, 
and determine if there is any legal or equitable basis for the motion. 
All of these cases and others relied upon by Richins and Porters, when 
read carefully, do not provide any basis for their arguments and, in fact, would 
allow the relief requested in this case because of the unusual circumstances 
involved. Both Richins and Porters have chosen to ignore those unusual 
circumstances. As pointed out above, they have not even addressed Chipman's 
claims of ambiguity, incompleteness, and unconscionability. They are hoping 
the court will likewise ignore those claims. The reason why should be obvious. 
Their own cases would require a reversal if any consideration is given to the 
unusual circumstances of this case. Look at those circumstances. Chipman is 
saddled with a $281,000.00 loss when the maximum default judgment against 
him would have been $130,000.00! There is not anywhere a description of the 
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property involved in the stipulation! The necessary elements of a contract are 
not present! The statute of frauds is not satisfied. While the lower court did 
not hold a hearing and make any findings of fact, it did say that it had extreme 
difficulty with Richins' failure to mitigate damages (R.622, line 9) and that the 
loss to Chipman was not "appropriate or fair" (R.621, line 17). These 
circumstances would require relief from the stipulation even under the 
authorities relied upon by Richins and Porters. 
POINT V 
RICHINS' AND PORTERS' BROAD DEFINITION OF MISTAKE 
IS NOT AND CANNOT BE THE MEANING INTENDED IN 
RULE 60(b). 
Both Richins and Porters have argued that any errors or injustice in this 
case must come within the definitions of mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or 
excusable neglect in Rule 60(b)(1) and Richins have given some general 
definitions to demonstrate how broadly these terms may be interpreted. 
Richins have asserted that the fact that "Chipman did not enter into any 
agreement at all" or "did not agree to anything" constitutes a mistake (Richins' 
Brief, p.7). He claims that inadvertence is another definition of mistake 
(Richins' Brief, p.8), and that, if "the terms of the stipulation are so 
ambiguous, inconsistent, unclear and confusing, . . . it would be a mistake to 
enter into such a stipulation" (Richins' Brief, p. 16). He even states that 
Chipman made the "mistake of entering into an unconscionable or unequitable 
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contract" (Richins' Brief, p. 18). That kind of definition of mistake will 
obviously include any and every kind of error or injustice that could be brought 
to the court's attention. Richins would have the court take the position that 
if anything at all happened that would give Chipman a right to relief, then a 
"mistake" was made and it, therefore, falls within Rule 60(b)(1) and relief must 
absolutely be sought within three months. That kind of thinking would make 
all of the other provisions of Rule 60(b) mere surplusage because not only is 
the inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect of Rule 60(b)(1) also a 
mistake, but so is the newly discovered evidence of Rule 60(b)(2,) the fraud, 
misrepresentation, or other misconduct of Rule 60(b)(3), the failure to 
personally serve a defendant of Rule 60(b)(4), a void judgment of Rule 
60(b)(5), an inequitable prospective judgment of Rule 60(b)(6), and any other 
reason under Rule 60(b)(7). While some of the cases may support such a 
broad definition, the argument itself tells us that the word "mistake", as used 
in Rule 60(b)(1), was intended to have a more limited meaning. 
Rather than try to determine what was intended by "mistake" within 
Rule 60(b)(1), it makes more sense to determine if the facts of this case fall 
within Rules 60(b)(5), (6) or (7). If they do, then the three-month limitation 
does not apply even if those same facts could be said to fit within Rule 
60(b)(1). Otherwise, Rules 60(b)(5), (6) and (7) would be mere surplusage 
and have no meaning. It is not too difficult to imagine a set of facts that could 
fit within more than one subdivision of the rule. If that is the case, why stretch 
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or contort the words of the rule, or the facts, to force those facts into one 
subdivision of the rule and remove them from another? Rule 1(a) requires 
that all of the rules "be liberally construed to secure the just, speedy, and 
inexpensive determination of every action." Liberal construction requires that 
more room be given to Rule 60(b)(5), (6) and (7) than Richins and Porters 
allow. 
The ambiguous, incomplete and unconscionable nature of the stipulation 
make it void and unenforceable. Rule 60(b)(5), therefore, applies. Because 
the inequitable nature of the stipulation did not come to light until long after 
it was entered and because the stipulation reaches nine years into the future, 
it is no longer equitable that it have prospective application. Rule 60(b)(6), 
therefore, applies. The ineffective representation of counsel, which is clear 
from a review of the stipulation itself without regard to the affidavits and the 
trial transcript, brings this case within Rule 60(b)(7). The aggravating and 
unconscionable nature of the facts in this case, if they do not fit within other 
subdivisions of the rule, clearly constitute "any other reason" within Rule 
60(b)(7). If those provisions apply, then the three-month limitation of the rule 
does not apply. The lower court had jurisdiction to hear Chipman's motions 
and its decision to the contrary should be reversed. 
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CONCLUSION 
The lower court's decision was that it did not have jurisdiction to 
consider Chipman's motions. Jurisdiction is a question of law and not a matter 
of discretion with the lower court. No evidentiary hearing has been held from 
which findings of fact could be made. The facts as alleged must be taken as 
true. The standard of review, therefore, is for correctness only and not for 
abuse of discretion. 
Chipman has received absolutely nothing by reason of the stipulation so 
it cannot be said that it has ratified or consented thereto by acceptance of 
benefits thereunder. The Wootton affidavit lacks credibility because of the 
circumstances under which it was created. It is refuted by the supplemental 
affidavit and the two affidavits support and prove the claims of Chipman. 
The cases relied upon by Richins and Porter all make allowance for the 
exceptional and aggravating circumstances of this case. Since neither Richins 
nor Porters have addressed those circumstances, it must be concluded that they 
do not dispute them. They simply want the court to conclude that it does not 
have jurisdiction to consider unconscionability, ambiguity, incompleteness, and 
other matters that render the stipulation void and unenforceable. That way 
they would not be forced to face the uncomfortable question of whether they 
themselves understood or intended the unconscionable results flowing from the 
stipulation. 
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Rule 60(b)(5), (6) or (7) include the facts of this case and the court has 
jurisdiction to consider the motions filed by Chipman. The decision of the 
lower court should be reversed and this case sent back with instructions to set 
aside the stipulation and judgment or to reform them to remove the 
unconscionability and the ambiguity. 
DATED this j2>£_ day of November, 1990. 
Respectfully submitted, 
BACKMAN, CLARK & MARSH 
Ralph J. Mailsh 
Attorneys for Appellant 
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I 
NOALL T. WOOTTON — #3554 
Attorney at Law 
P.O. Box 310 
American Fork, UT 84003-0310 
Telephones (801) 756-3576 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
DENNIS J. RICHINS and 
SUESANN RICHINS, 
Plaintiff, 
SUPPLEMENTAL AFFIDAVIT OF 
NOALL T. WOOTTON 
VB 
DELBERT CHIPMAN & SONS CO., 
INC., D. RAY CHIPMAN, 
Individually, RICHARD PORTER, 
KENNETH PORTER and JOHN DOES 
1 through 10, 
Defendants. Civil No. 
Civil No. CV-87-1076 
Judge Boyd L. Park 
) 
jss. 
STATE OF UTAH 
COUNTY OF UTAH ) 
Noall T. wootton, being first duly sworn on oath, deposes 
and says: 
1. On May 4, 1989, counsel for the plaintiffs prepared and 
sent to my office by facsimile machine an Affidavit with a heading 
of the above case. 
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2. With some minor changes that I made, I reprepared the 
document on court approved paper and signed it swearing to its 
validity. 
3. it has since come to my attention that the plaintiffs 
are interpreting the settlement agreement that was entered into 
before the court as calling for reduction of the semi-annual 
installments due under the lease agreements from $24,000 to 
$19,700 and further reducing it by another $2,500, and that the 
Affidavit that I signed supports that proposition. If this is the 
interpretation that is being given to my Affidavit, it is in 
error. After having examined the stipulation that was entered 
into and the transcript of the stipulation that was entered into 
in open court, it was my understanding that there would be a total 
reduction in the original lease payments of $48,000 amortized over 
the remaining nine years of the lease and deducted $2,500 out of 
each semi-annual payment; that a $21,000 payment: that was overdue 
would be forgiven; and that there would be certain adjustments 
spelled out in the stipulation for reductions in the payments if 
any of the leased properties or permits were unavailable to be 
delivered to the plaintiffs. 
-2-
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4* I don't recall the mentioning of any additional $2,500 
semi-annual lease payments reductions. The $19,700 figure was 
arrived at by taking the original semi-annual payment of $24,000 
and reducing it by the $2,500 referred to above and by reducing 
it further by $1,800 each semi-annual payment because the property 
known as the Deer Creed Grazing Range for which the plaintiffs 
were paying the defendants $3f500 per year, had been cancelled, 
and the owners were no dealing directly with the plaintiffs* 
DATED this ?j$( day of June, 1989. 
NOALL T* WOOTTON 
Attorney at Law 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO before me this day of June, 
1989 
NOTARY PUBLIC 
Residing at; 
My Commission Expires: 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the day of June, 1989, I 
mailed a true and accurate copy of the foregoing SUPPLEMENTAL 
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AFFIDAVIT OF NOALL T, WOOTTON first class, postage prepaid, to the 
followingi 
Ralph J. Harsh 
BACKMAH, CLARK 6 MARSH 
68 South Main, #800 
Salt Lake City, UT 84101 
George A. Hunt 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
10 Exchange Place, #1100 
Salt Lake City, UT 841111 
Jaiaea R. Brown 
370 East South Temple 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
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WOOTTON & SMITH 
ASSOCIATION OF SOLE ftUCTICIOREIIS 
8 NORTH CENTER 
NOAUT. WOOTTON ' J B J 310
 Q m m m m n m m 
S U N l t t R SMITH TELEPHONE (801) 756-3576 
AMEfilCAN mi, UTAH 94003 
June 7, 1989 
Mr* James R. Brown 
370 East South Temple 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Mr. Ralph J. Marsh 
BACKMAN, CLARK & MARSH 
68 South Main, #800 
Salt Lake City, UT 84101 
Re: Rlchins v. Chipman, et al. 
Gent. L emeu: 
I have been advised that there is a misunderstanding in 
the interpretation of the stipulation that was entered into between 
the plaintiffs and the defendants in the above-referenced matter 
that you presently have going, In reading over the Affidavit that 
you prepared for my signature, Jim, I overlooked the fact that 
under paragraph 10*b) that mentions the reduction of the semi-
annual installment to $19,700, that that would be interpreted to 
be in addition to the reduction in paragraph c) that we referred 
to of $2/500* As I recall the agreement, we simply arrived at <a 
reduction figure of $45,000 plus the $21,000 payment that we 
claimed was already due and unpaid, and that the $45,000 would be 
amortized over the nine year remaining term of the leafed it $2,500 
reduction per semi-annual payment. I don't recall any OLIUT $2,500 
semi-annual payment deduction referred to, and have therefore 
prepared the enclosed addendum to the original Affidavit clarifying 
that point. 
Jim, 1 won't be sending this amended Affidavit in until 
tomorrow. This should give you an opportunity to convince me that 
1 am wrong in my interpretation, but in searching the transcript 
of the stipulation done in open Court, I can't find anything to the 
contrary. 
Sincerely, 
Noall T. wootton 
NTW:kJ 
cc: Janiee R. Brown, Ralph Marsh, George Hunt 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
THIS IS TO CERTIFY that four (4) true and correct copies of the foregoing 
Appellant's Reply Brief were mailed, postage prepaid, on the day of November, 1990, 
to the following: 
JARDINE, LINEBAUGH, BROWN & DUNN 
James R. Brown 
370 East South Temple, Suite 400 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
Attorneys for Dennis J. Richins 
and Suesann Richins 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
George A. Hunt and Ryan E. Tibbitts 
10 Exchange Place, 11th Floor 
P.O. Box 45000 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110 
Attorneys for Richard Porter 
and Kenneth Porter 
